

Review

Endangering good governance for sustainable democracy: the continuing struggle against corruption in Nigeria

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Accepted 05 April, 2018

With enormous oil wealth and large market, Nigeria is qualified to be called the giant of Africa. Unfortunately, the giant stature was lost by over 20 years of brutal military rule and corruption. Twelve years into the nascent democratic governance, the struggle against corruption and mismanagement continue to endanger all attempts at democratic consolidation. Poor leadership as epitomised in the alarming records of political corruption has therefore led to socio-economic stagnation and alienation of the citizenry from political processes. Shortcoming had been prevalent in the activities of the Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs), especially the ICPC and EFCC because they had been weak and ineffective, poorly funded and not supported by strong political will for successful campaign against graft and other associated vices. The little success had been lopsided, vindictive and selective, so, rather than abating, it has been festering and counter-productive. Unfortunately, without good governance, democratic reforms for sustainability have limited impact. Hence, we are challenged in this paper to reappraise the continued struggles with a view to seeing it work.

Keywords: Corruption, good governance, democratic sustainability, citizens, legitimacy.

INTRODUCTION

With enormous wealth from oil resources, agricultural and ecological advantages, and large markets that enhanced economic, social and political strength, Nigeria is qualified in almost all methods of assessment to be called the giant of Africa. Unfortunately the giant was brought to its knees by over 20 years of brutal and corrupt military rule, which left a legacy of executive dominance and a political corruption in the hands of Nigeria's so-called political jobbers and "godfathers" – powerful political bosses sitting atop vast patronage networks who view the government primarily through the lens of their own personal enrichment - (Kew 2006:3). This accounted for the reasons why scholars described Nigeria as an "unfinished state" (Joseph et al., 2006), and as "a truculent African tragedy" (Ayittey, 2006) in the midst of abundant human and material resources, struggling to get over the factors that have come to challenge all efforts at democratic consolidation. Efforts at building a democratic polity that is accountable and responsive to the citizenry – after the military enslavement - have en-

trapped the nation at the "political crossroad" (Kew, 2006).

The focus of the leadership at various levels of government was parochial with the overriding consideration for personal survival rather than national development. Attempts at promoting democratic consolidation were hampered by the personality cult of the emerging political gladiators who exploited the instrument of state power to promote their personal agenda. Nigeria's political elites', as Sklar et al. (2006) have rightly observed, "...view for power and control was through the vast spoils of office". The centralized political and economic structures "made the military and civilian individuals who controlled key state posts fabulously wealthy, while 70% of Nigerians fell into abject poverty" (Sklar et al., 2006). Poor leadership therefore led to socio-economic stagnation and alienation of the citizenry from political processes, causing a low level of system affect – the sense of belonging to and identifying with the political system. According to Kew (2006):

The Nigerian government remains distant from serving the interest of its people. Politics at the federal, state, and local levels of the Nigerian federation are dominated by the powerful mandarin who built vast patronage networks during the military days and who now use political office to expand these networks and their personal fortunes.

However, just immediately after the enthronement of the new democratic governance on May 29, 1999, Nigeria launched a comprehensive anti-corruption policy, under the watchful eyes of the newly elected President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military ruler, long time crusader against corruption and a member of the Transparency International. The fourth republic was ushered in when there was a rising domestic awareness of the socio-economic cost of corruption and dramatic changes in international attitude towards countries perceived as corrupt. This became some of the reasons why corruption (and its eradication) was made a major topic during the election and indeed throughout the tenure of Obasanjo and others after him. The seriousness of corruption in Nigeria was also underlined by the voting of the country as the world's `second most corrupt nation in 1999 (TI, 1999), just weeks before Obasanjo was elected, and most corrupt in 2000 (TI, 2000), as well as the sharp decline in most macro-economic indicators and living standards of most Nigerians despite huge oil revenue. In his broadcast to the nation, the President says: "...no society can achieve its potential, if it allows corruption to become the full-blown cancer it has in Nigeria" (Nigerian Tribune 30, May 1999). It was, therefore, an enemy to be fought until it retreated. Boasting however, the president did promise:

Our administration will be unequivocally committed to transparency and accountability. Our ultimate objective will be that there are no sacred cows. I emphatically say that our administration will not offer opportunity to any one we know had in the past abused public trust in anyway (Nigerian Tribune 30, May 1999).

However, in spite of several efforts afterward including the establishment of Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs), the country is still struggling to abate the scourge of corruption, and we are still suffering from its associated ills that have crippled the wheel of growth and progress of the hitherto giant nation. The question is how long can we wait to see good democratic governance operative in the country, especially for the benefit of the common man?

Definition of Terms

Good Governance

The World Bank offered an insightful explanation of good governance when it averred that, it is "the means by

which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development" (World Bank 1992), this category of development is what Potter (2000:379) calls "sound development management". That is a broad sphere of public sector management; accountability; legal framework for development (reforms); information and technology; the legitimacy of government; the competence of governments to formulate appropriate policies; make timely decision; implement them effectively and deliver services (see also Simbine 2000, Gibson 1998). And as a necessary condition for development, a system of good governance in a limited administrative sense would consist of a set of rules and institutions which is open, transparent, efficient and accountable. Such a system would be committed to improving the public welfare and responsive to the needs of its citizens, competent to assure law and order, and deliver public services.

Therefore it involves a normative judgment which indicates a preferred relation that should ideally govern relationship between state and society and between a government and the people. According to a newspaper report, it is "the positive actions undertaken by a government to promote democracy and achieve social justice" (New Nigeria, October 3, 2000:8). Richard Joseph (1990:202) argued that:

...the most decisive way in which (political) accountability can be achieved is through the requirement that a governments continuation in office depends on the active approval of the people as expressed in competitive election.

He is of the opinion therefore that effective (good) governance requires institutional pluralism, communal empowerment and meaningful popular participation. To this, Abolade Eyinla (2000:22) added accountability, security of human rights and civil liberties, devolution of powers and respect for local autonomy, which all constitute a challenge to democratic regimes.

Democratic Consolidation

Originally, the concept of democratic consolidation or put differently democratic sustainability was to mean an identifiable phase in the process of transition from authoritarian to democratic systems that are critical to the establishment of a stable, institutional and lasting democracy. All discussions of democratic consolidation carry an explicit or implicit definition of what democracy is, and analysts are not predisposed to assigning the "consolidated democracy" label to a political system that does not meet all of their criteria for what a democracy should be.

This is why Beetham considered democratic consolidation to describe the challenge of making new democracies secure, of extending their life expectancy beyond the short-term, of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian repression and of building dams against eventual reverse waves (Beetham 1994:157-172). The inference from Beetham's definition of democratic consolidation reveals the starting point of a regime to be consolidated. First of all, any talk about democratic consolidation presupposes that a democratic regime exists from the beginning to the end of the process. Once a transition from authoritarian rule in a given country has reached a point where free, fair and competitive elections are held, democratic actors often can not afford to lean back, relax, and enjoy what Schedler (1997) called "bounded uncertainties". More often than not, regime threatening or these bounded uncertainties persist and the democrats fundamental anxieties do not recede but only shift from establishing democracy's core institutions to securing what they have achieved. For these actors, consolidating democracy means reducing the probability of breaking (or what Beetham, 1994 called 'reverse waves') to a point where they can feel reasonably confident that democracy will persist in the near future (Schedler, 1998:91-107).

Corruption

Corruption is simply defined as a dishonest or immoral behaviour which is not in line with the generally accepted norms and standards or perpetration of a vice against the public well-being. For example, Vision 2010 (1997) committee perceived corruption as "all those improper actions or transactions aimed at changing the normal course of events, judgment and position of trust". That is, corruption is a behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of public roles because of private (personal, close family, groups) pecuniary or status gains of certain types of private influence (Nye, 1996:417-427) – meaning officials taking advantage of their offices to acquire wealth or other personal benefits. It should be noted however, that public roles and responsibilities are usually entrusted to the public office holders by the people, especially in a democratic system. The trust became corrupted when public roles and resources are used for private benefits. Johnston (1996:324) puts it succinctly as:

Fraud or corruption occurs when a person in a position of trust and responsibility, in defiance of prescribed norms, suppresses the rules to advance his personal interest at the expense of the public interest he/she has been entrusted to guard and promote.

In a more elaborate manner, Alex Gboyega (1996:3-12) was to arrive at a definition of corruption as being:

Any decision, act or conduct that was perverse to democratic norms and values. It also covers any decision, act or conduct that subverted the integrity of people in authority or institutions charged with promoting, defending or sustaining the democratization process, thereby undermining its effectiveness in performing its assigned roles.

The Nexus

Good governance and democratic consolidation connects when democratic characters and collective political behaviour are measured by a body of ideas with required feasible or practicable instruments for directing human political conduct for the common good of the public (Azeez, 2003, 2009). A situation that allows the machinery of government to run both efficiently and effectively with a view to achieving the collective societal goal of accountability and responsibility without jeopardising the national ethos and integrity. A state at the level of consolidated democracy therefore constitutes a government where public consent becomes the basis of its legitimacy and authority. A government that is accountable and responsive to the interest of the people protect their civil liberty and more importantly rule according to the dictate of the established law. And where legitimacy has suffered because of corrupt nature and characters of the leaders, then corruption becomes the clog in the wheel of democratic sustenance. The leaders are unaccountable and unresponsive to the citizens leading to apathy, alienation and political withdrawal from the people against the norm that ensure consolidation.

The Spate of Corruption in Nigeria

The current democratic government's anticorruption drive under Chief Olusegun Obasanjo was more than any other reasons propelled by an unprecedented disclosure of evidences of corruption perpetrated by his immediate predecessors, especially the late General Sani Abacha, who ruled Nigeria from 1993 to1998. After his death in 1998, his successor, General Abdusalami Abubakar, launched a probe into his financial dealings. These investigations uncovered large evidences showing that Abacha and his collaborators had diverted billions of dollars in public funds into several local and overseas bank accounts, while also corruptly acquiring choice properties in many locations within and outside the country. Public call for a strong anticorruption stance by the newly elected civilian government was further fuelled by the caution with which General Abubakar treated those indicted by his probe (Azeez, 2006).

At the global level, the war against corruption was motivated by a genuine desire to correct Nigeria's fre-

quent appearance at the top of the table of the world's most corrupt nations. The 2008 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) released by the Transparency International showed that the country is rated 121 out of 180 countries surveyed. On a scale of 10.0, Nigeria scored 1.6 in 1999; 1.2 in 2000; 1.0 in 2001; 1.6 in 2002; 1.4 in 2003; 1.6 in 2004; 1.9 in 2005; 2.2 in 2006; 2.2 in 2007 and 2.7 in 2008 (TI, 2008). This became not only a source of personal embarrassment to Nigerian officials travelling overseas, especially President Olusegun Obasanjo who was himself one of the founding members of Transparency International, but also an obstacle to the government's much desired goal of reconciling Nigeria with the international community, after many years of diplomatic isolation, of securing debt forgiveness, and much needed foreign investments.

To make matters worse, negative international publicity against Nigeria coincided with a time when the international community became increasingly concerned about lack of good governance and its consequences in developing countries. As a result, the Obasanjo government was placed under international pressure and threats of sanctions, to implement measures against corruption and other forms of financial crimes. The Nigerian government was also promised some benefits if reforms were implemented. This included a possible debt write-off, which materialised when the Paris Club wrote off \$18 billion, representing 60 percent of Nigeria's debt, in early 2005.

As a result of these, the government started and within a jiffy, cases of corrupt practices, some of which were clearly beyond comprehension were prevalent. For instance, there were cases which involved colossal sums of money, perpetrated by top government officials including Ministers, Legislators, former Inspector General of Police (IGP) Tafa Balogun and Governors.

For example, former Delta State Governor, James Ibori, was slammed with a 129-count charge by the EFCC of laundering over ₦9.1 billion. Another notable case of alleged corruption by a former governor was that of ex-Abia Chief Executive, Orji Uzor Kalu who was accused of using his loot of ₦3.1 billion to fund SLOK Airline and two banks in the Gambia and Sierra Leone, in addition to owning houses in London and the US. Another ex-governor, Saminu Turaki of Jigawa State, who is now a senator, was accused of spending ₦36 million of public funds to acquire oil blocks from the Federal Government. Ex-governor Rev. Jolly Nyame of Taraba State was charged with stealing ₦1.6 billion belonging to the state. Other former governors charged for various financial crimes include Edo State's Lucky Igbinedion, Ekiti's Ayo Fayose, Rivers' Peter Odili and Chimaroke Nnamani of Enugu State. Nnamani is standing trial for his alleged illegal diversion of public funds totalling ₦5.6 billion, alongside two of his former commissioners, Peter Mba and Sam Ejiofor and some companies linked to him (Kofarmata, 2005). The former

president's daughter, Iyabo Obasanjo-Bello, a Senator of the Federal Republic was enmeshed in two different financial scandals. In December 2007, Iyabo Obasanjo-Bello, was involved in a contract scandal amounting to ₦3.5 billion involving her and an Austrian firm. According to the EFCC, the Senator used her mother's maiden name, Akinlawon to conceal her identity in the contract. (The Punch March 19, 2008). Senator Obasanjo was back in the financial crimes news again in a scandal of mismanaged fund in the Ministry of Health. The scandal led to the resignation of Mrs. Adenike Grange and her deputy, Gabriel Aduku. After a series of hide and seek with the EFCC, Obasanjo, Chairman, Senate Committee on Health, was eventually arraigned in court over ₦300 million unspent budget scam (This Day, Aug. 6, 2008:9).

Similarly, the resignation of Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala barely 24 hours after she was sworn in as the Finance Minister was an indictment on the government's efforts at eradicating corruption. Report had it that, she had a sharp disagreement with the leadership style of the President (The Sunday Sun July 20, 2003). Apart from the removal of the budgeting function to the Presidency, she was not comfortable with the clearing regime at Nigerian Ports – a place known to be the soup pot of Nigerian leaders (see EFCC's report on Chief Bode George and the NPA). Still the same year precisely in August, the Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) called for explanation from the Presidency about what happened to ₦35 billion meant for Local Government monthly in addition to repeated allegations that several billions of Naira of oil revenues that were missing from the Federation Account.

Giving a graphic detail of the "misrule and mismanagement" that had battered Nigeria and plunged the nation's citizens into economic misery, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, the then EFCC Chairman said the over \$400 billion that had been looted from the common wealth by the leaders is "six times the total value of resources committed to rebuilding Western Europe after the Second World War."

For the purpose of this piece, we chronicle some corruption incidences in the first eight years of the current regime:

- June 1999 – In a special closed session, the National Assembly debates whether to increase their housing allowances to 18 million nairas (US\$140,000) per year. The debate comes shortly after a divisive campaign by teachers and civil servants to institute a 4,000 nairas (US\$30)-per-month minimum wage.
- July 1999 – Ibrahim Salisu Buhari, the first speaker of the House under Obasanjo, resigns when it is discovered that he lied about his academic background and age. Buhari pleads guilty to forgery and perjury and is fined 2,500 nairas (US\$20) but is pardoned the following year.
- June 2000 – The National Assembly passes legislation to create the Independent Corrupt Practices

and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), which is inaugurated in September.

□ July 2000 – A government investigation finds evidence of inflated procurement contracts in the National Assembly, some awarded to companies in which legislators had a financial interest. High-level officials are implicated, including Senate President Chuba Okadigbo and Senate Deputy President Alhaji Haruna Abubakar.

□ August 2000 – Okadigbo is impeached for corruption and misappropriation of funds. After his impeachment, Okadigbo is indicted for spending public money on cars and car furnishings and resigns in October. The indictment is eventually dropped.

□ October 2000 – President Obasanjo is accused by eight House members of bribing them to help oust Speaker of the House Ghali Na'Abba, who Obasanjo attacked for his corruption. The legislators dramatically unload the alleged bribes on the House floor.

□ October 2000 – Construction begins on one of Obasanjo's pet projects — a modern sports stadium in Abuja. The estimated cost of 49 billion nairas (US\$380 million) eventually goes hundreds of millions over budget.

□ February 2002 – A government anti-corruption commission issues its first indictment of a high-level official, accusing Justice Garba Abdullahi of demanding a 1.2 million nairas (US\$9,000) bribe from a businessman to reverse an adverse ruling.

□ April 2002 – The House unanimously strikes down a measure signed into law that would have outlawed the formation of new political parties ahead of the 2003 presidential election, claiming Obasanjo had inserted new language into the bill after it was submitted to him.

□ August 2002 – The National Assembly accuses Obasanjo of 17 separate indictable offenses including incompetence, disregard for the rule of law and corruption.

□ September 2002 – The ICPC obtains its first conviction, sentencing local government chairman Emmanuel Egwuba to three years in prison for awarding a contract without budgetary approval.

□ January 2003 – Auditor-General Vincent Azie's report covering the 2001 financial year chronicles corruption, including a number of suspicious payments and honoraria to politicians, and criticizes all branches of government. Obasanjo fires Azie in February.

□ February 2003 – The National Assembly passes a bill replacing the ICPC with a less powerful anti-corruption entity, which Obasanjo subsequently vetoes. The Assembly's attempt to override the veto in May is ruled illegal by the Federal High Court.

□ April 2003 – Obasanjo wins re-election in the first civilian-run presidential elections since the end of military rule. International observers note serious irregularities during balloting.

□ November 2003 – A government report details the systematic looting of the once-prosperous Nigeria Airways airline and implicates 90 people in its downfall. The report recommends prosecution of several individuals and pursuing the 51 billion nairas (US\$400 million) looted by companies and government officials. Including also the trial of one Makanjuola who was in the dock for stealing ₦500 million as Permanent Secretary in the ministry of Defense.

□ September 2003 – Nasir El-Rufai the Minister for the Federal Capital Territory alleged that two Senators close to the President, Deputy Senate President, Ibrahim Mantu and Majority Leader, Jonathan Zwingina, asked him for a bribe of N54 million (US \$418,000) to secure senate approval for his appointment.

□ December 2003 – After the ICPC announces it is probing a bribery scandal involving French firm Sagem SA, Obasanjo fires Labor Minister Hussaini Zannuwa Akwanga. Sagem won a 27 billion nairas (US\$214 million) contract to produce national identity cards. At month's end, prosecutors charge five people, including Akwanga and two other former ministers, with taking up to 128 million nairas (US\$1 million) in bribes from Sagem.

□ June 2004 – Shell, one of the largest oil contractors in Nigeria, admits it has inadvertently contributed to the country's poverty, environmental degradation, violence and corruption through its business activities but spurns calls for the company to leave. As a good faith gesture, Shell contributes millions of dollars to support various community development projects and formulates "13 big rules" to make sure those contributions are not misappropriated. It also claims to have fired 29 employees in 2003 for corruption.

□ March 2005 – Education Minister Fabian Osuji is fired for allegedly bribing the National Assembly to secure more funds for his ministry. He formally protests that such behavior is common at all levels of government. In April, Senate Speaker Adolphus Wabara resigns after President Obasanjo accuses him of accepting Osuji's 51 million nairas (US\$400,000) bribe.

□ April 2005 – President Obasanjo fires housing minister Alice Mobolaji Osomo after it is alleged hundreds of properties were sold below market value to top officials instead of going on public sale.

□ November 2005 – The European Commission approves €24.7 million (US\$31 million) to support the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and other anti-corruption agencies. By August 2006, the EFCC in its three years of operation will have arrested and investigated more than 5,000 people, secured 82 convictions and recovered 641 billion nairas (US\$5 billion) in looted assets.

□ November 2005 – Former chief of police Tafa Balogun is convicted and sentenced to six months in jail for extorting more than 13 billion nairas (US\$100 million) during his three-year tenure.

□ December 2005 – Environment Minister Iyorcha

Ayu resigns after lawmakers raise concerns about various procurement deals he handled.

□ December 2005 – Diepreye Alamiyeseigha, governor of the oil-rich Bayelsa state, is arrested on 40 counts of corruption and money laundering. In July 2006, British authorities return about £1 million (US\$1.9 million) of the allegedly illicit gains that he stashed in British banks. Six months later, the EFCC proclaims that at least 24 state governors will face corruption charges at the end of their tenures in May 2007 when their constitutional immunity from prosecution expires.

□ April 2006 – Record high oil prices enable Nigeria to be the first African country to pay off its debt to the Paris Club, an informal group of financial officials from the world's richest countries.

□ May 2006 – The Senate rejects a proposed constitutional amendment that would have allowed President Obasanjo to run for a third term in 2007.

□ August 2006 – Switzerland's ambassador to Nigeria announces the 90 billion nairas (US\$700 million) looted by former president Sani Abacha and deposited in Swiss banks has almost completely been repatriated to Nigeria. A remaining 900 million nairas (US\$7 million) is still being held in the account of an unnamed Nigerian who seeks to prove that the money was honestly earned by Abacha.

One other case that requires attention, but yet to be resolved is the Halliburton bribe case. Though Halliburton and its former subsidiary Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR) agreed to the largest corruption settlement ever paid by a US company under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) - \$579 million – their historic guilty plea was only the latest in a string of high level bribery cases to secure contracts in Nigeria (This Day, March 19, 2007; The Punch, March 19, 2009). Other cases like the Siemens \$1.6billion settlement scandal, Willbros Inc's \$32million, Panalpina's case in the Nigeria's national identity card scheme with Sagem going to about \$200 million as bribe to senior government officials can not but be mentioned. These cases equally draw concern about the unremitting level of official corruption in Nigeria, despite the claims of successive governments that they show "zero-tolerance" for corruption (The New York Times Dec. 15, 2008, see also, EFCC Magazine, 2008:48 and ICPC Monitor, 2008:34).

Anti-Corruption Efforts in Nigeria

The proliferation of political and official corruption of an enormous magnitude as reported has had severe negative consequences on Nigeria. The effect has included decreased foreign direct investments in the country and tainting of Nigeria's national image. The menace of these crimes, the recognition of the magnitude and gravity of the situation, and lack of effectiveness of the existing institutions to fight corruption prior to 1999

led the new democratic government to quickly enact the ICPC (2000), the EFCC (Establishment) Act (2004); and the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004. These Acts make comprehensive provisions to prohibit the laundering of the proceeds of a crime an illegal act, provide appropriate penalties and expands the interpretation of financial institutions, it also provide scope of supervision of regulatory authorities on corrupt activities, among others. The establishment of these institutions has contributed significantly in combating those activities, to the extent that the score card assessing both the EFCC and ICPC as at 2006/2007 revealed as follows:

ISSUES/AGENCIES	EFCC	ICPC
Number of persons arraigned:	(300+)	(185)
Number of person convicted:	(145)	(20)
Value of Assets/fund recovered:	(₦725 billion)	(₦3.9)

Source: ICPC Monitor, Vol 1, Issue 5, Aug – Oct 2008 and EFCC Magazine, Vol. 3, No.2, August 2008.

Equally, since 2004, Nigeria has taken significant steps towards complying with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), including conducting comprehensive audits of Petroleum sector (World Bank, 2006).

The Yar'Adua/Jonathan administration also added the Public Procurement Act and the Due Process Office, i.e the e-payment (since January 2009) and the e-procurement (since 2008) to improve transparency in public procurements.

The struggles

Shortcomings in the efforts at curbing graft had been prevalent. The record of success at various levels of government including the states and local government had been short of expectations, considering the magnitude of funds the nation loose to swindlers, contract scams and money laundering. The Acts establishing the Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) had been weak and ineffective. The agencies had been poorly funded and there were evidences of lack of political will by the Crusaders to actualise an objective anti-corruption campaign. Apart from this, the fight has been lopsided, vindictive, selective, biased, one-sided and meretricious / falsely attractive. The effect has been counter-productive, instead of it abating, it is festering controllably. The campaign has been the instrument of the Presidency and his cohort to 'deal' with opposition in order to serve as deterrent to others who may want to go against the will of the 'state' (the men in power). The point here is that this double standard, these warped treatments are in themselves acts of corruption.

For instance, the EFCC has not done anything about

the ₦84billion naira that is missing in NPA. Neither did anything done about the ₦311billion that is missing in NNPC. About ₦50million bribe was given to pro-third term legislators, during the tenure elongation debate in the National Assembly, yet we are still in the dark as to the outcome of the investigation. Senator Ibrahim Mantu, was reported to have mismanaged ₦400million in the failed hajj operations in 2005, still he remained sacred in the eyes of the anti-corruption agencies. This attempt is just to mention a very few instances of the selective procedure of the ACAs, which is also corruption in the real sense.

The above is aided by the fact that the agencies are not independent of the government, who funds and appoints leaders into them. With enormous power to hire and fire, the commissions could hardly be assertive in the discharge of their duties without fear or favour.

The Yar'Adua/Jonathan did not only inherit corruption from the previous administration, they also inherited the weak and ineffective campaign against grafts. The ACAs were hampered from performing their noble course. Even when the National Assembly held public hearings into allegations of corruption they fail to pass progressive legislations that could help track misdemeanour, including the Freedom of Information Bill. For example in December 2007, Nuhu Ribadu, the then head of Nigeria's EFCC took the bold step of indicting the powerful former Delta State Governor James Ibori. Two weeks later, the Inspector General of Police (IGP) ordered Mr. Ribadu to resign and attend a year-long training course, because there are a lot of things to still cover for loyal party faithful and financiers.

CONCLUSION

Without good governance, democratic reforms for sustainability have limited impact. This is so because good governance includes issues like the absence of rent seeking behaviour, transparency, accountability, proper enforcement of rights and the rule of law, and more importantly attracting legitimacy and performance of civic rights. Good governance thus plays a critical role in ensuring collaborative civil-societal relationship, cooperative peaceful coexistence and progressive process of democratic culture and socialization. It also attracts investment to a country, improving productivity and competitiveness, promoting political stability and in the end contributing to rapid economic growth. However, the progress in governance has been haphazard and inconsistent in Nigeria. Corruption still persists in several areas of national life and rent seeking behaviour is still pervasive. The principle of the rule of law is still under attack. These may explain why foreign investments in the Nigerian economy have not increased as much as expected. As a final point, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the reforms advanced by the government

for a sustainable democracy is still a struggle unaccomplished. I suggest we do not ignore and divert attention from Nigeria's fundamental problems of over-centralization, ethnicity, and sectionalism; increasing inability to produce good political leaders, with enough political will for success; and scant attention to human resource development. These are factors that have aided corruption and graft, hence jeopardising good governance and eventual struggle for democratic consolidation.

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